Disclaimer: This entry is not emulator related. If you're here only for Makaron news, please ignore it.
I found a very interesting paper a few days ago, here's a link: Breakthrough silicon scanning discovers backdoor in military chip
This is just a brief summary of a side attack on Actel/Microsemi ProASIC3 chips. The power analysis idea alone is mighty interesting - for such a big silicon structure as FPGA it seems impossible at first, but then it's not the whole chip that has been put under scrutiny. It's just the part responsible for JTAG and some of the internal addressing structrure, but even then measuring the subtle current fluctuations is not exactly trivial. While simple on paper, this task requires a number of fast and well-calibrated ADCs and most importantly a software capable of processing the collected data. I could probably come up with a good enough electrical component of such testbed but that software part is like magic to me - and I'm no stranger to programming :) Ah well, I suppose it's better for me to accept that certain math problems are way above my head, less stress that way (I guess ignorance IS a bliss after all).
Anyway, ProASIC3 series have been well designed, with countermeasures in place to thwart this type of attacks. The paper mentions fuzzy clock sources and very low leakage transistors, as well as carefull structure design - all these factors contribute greatly to the chip's security. It is, after all, touted the most secure FPGA available on the market today. But there's a twist: apparently the chip has some undocumented features that allow one to read it's configuration and internal memories even after it has been secured with secret key.
You see, when it comes to JTAG it's pretty much normal that most (if not all) of the protocol commands intended for factory testing are kept secret. This is to protect the manufacturer secrets, nothing strange to it. However, it's one thing when the design has, say, additional structures to improve yields and some of them are disabled even if fully operational in order to keep all chips with the same specs. It's a dirty little trick but in the end acceptable. It's quite another story with intentional backdoors placed into the design.
Hidden features like these are handy for the people who make the product, in case there is a problem that needs to be fixed after the production has been completed. It doesn't have to be a hardware thing - remember the first X360 DVD drives? Those could be reprogrammed if you just knew how to do it, sometimes even via the SATA link so there wasn't even any need to open the cover. This was a firmware backdoor and once discovered it was ultimately used enable the drives to accept recordable media as original games. I seriously doubt Microsoft had any knowledge of this prior to discovery by hackers, this was most likely something the drive manufacturer added on it's own to be able to reuse returned/repaired drives. This 'cost saving' in company A caused company B much grief and money loss.
So, the big question: Was it Actel that put this 'feature' in the design, or was this added by the Chinese factory that actually made the chips? Either way this will have far reaching consequences as ProASIC3 series is often used in military equipment. So I wonder if it's just a blunder or a some sort of espionage attempt. Actel does claim that their products are secure and the contents of the chip cannot be easily recovered as there is no way of doing so. Clearly, that is a lie. Obviously the company now says that there isn't any backdoor but you can't prove that something doesn't exist. On the other hand, the researchers will need to verify their claim by showing a succesful attack attempt to the public. So I guess we wait and see what happens. If it turns out to be true Actel's whole CPLD/FPGA branch could be finished.
In other, somewhat related news: I've taken some interest in software defined radios. I have to say that just by researching the subject my understanding of modern signal processing technology has gone up quite a bit. The best SDRs out there use FPGAs for signal processing - ADC interface, sampling rates, decimation, digital filtering, etc. A proper design can cover a big chunk of frequency spectrum while sampling at many Ms/s. The best way to go about it is to use quadrature demodulators to produce I/Q signals. These can be then freely processed PC-side (as long as you have CPU power to do so) to obtain anything from AM radio audio to satellite imagery. Problem is, these toys are costly :) I'm not about to throw 3-4k$ at my 'new hobby' so the only other options are:
1) Self-made QAM mixer/demodulator that uses audio frequency output. This can be plugged into modern PC soundcard and sampling rates of 96kHz or even 192kHz are avaiable, at a very nice 16-bit resolution. Some cards can even go as high as 24 bits, though in reality the SNR is probably not going to exceed some 20-22 bits even in best of conditions. I've actually designed a PCB based on YU1LM DR2A design, which is pretty simple and anyone can make it cheaply since there aren't any hard to come by parts. It needs external VFO at 4x the local oscillator frequency but I can make that too. Worst case scenario I'll buy a cheap DDS kit based on AD9850 or something like that.
Here's what the PCB will look like:
2) For some 20$ you can buy a USB DVB-T dongle with Realtek RTL2832 chip inside. That chip model is important, apparently it can be put into a 'dumb' mode where it samples and passes the I/Q data unmodified to the PC. With a proper tuner attached it will cover 80-1700MHz range, with some holes though, and the SNR depends on the frequency. The best tuner seems to be Elonics E4000 but other ones (FC0012/FC0013 for example) will also work, though with more holes so less frequency coverage. This mode was meant for software processing of FM and DAB/DAB+ radio signals, and it seems to be undocumented feature not present in other designs. RTL2832 can only provide 8-bit data but it makes up for that in the bandwidth of 1Ms/s up to 3.2Ms/s. The best setting is an integer multiple of the on-board resonator, usually 28.8MHz, so that there are no sample drops. So, while far from perfect it's a great bargain for 20 bucks.
And the best thing, even though it's called a radio, is that such setup is pretty much a PC-based spectrum analyzer. These things are quite expensive as standalone hardware so it'll be interesting to see if a self-made project like this can be useful for something other than listening to police radio traffic :)